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Abstract—In this paper, we address several issues that are often 
overlooked in the fusion of various knowledge components when 
this knowledge is expressed in full standard logic. It is shown that 
not solving these issues can lead to inadequate inferences. As a 
case study, we consider the legal domain, which has been an 
application target for knowledge engineering for decades. Real-
life examples based on the confrontation of two different legal 
systems about a same international agreement are investigated. 
High-level information fusion, knowledge fusion, logic-based 
fusion, knowledge engineering 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Formalizing laws and rules from the legal domain and 
implementing them in decision systems has been a specific 
application target of Artificial Intelligence research for decades 
[1]. For example, some early expert systems were related to the 
legal domain [2], which was also one early major motivation 
and application area for logic programming [3]. Ever since, the 
logic-based formalization and computer-implementation of 
laws and legal knowledge has been a domain in its own right, 
with its own research community [4-7] and agenda [8]. 
 Whereas the logic-based formalization and implementation 
of legal knowledge has been extensively studied, little attention 
has been given so far to the problem of fusing or confronting 
several components of legal knowledge. In this paper, we aim 
at contributing to answering the question: how could several 
sources of legal knowledge encoded in several components be 
fused so that a standard-logic artificial agent could reason 
about it? 
A major issue that is not addressed in this paper occurs 
when several knowledge components are logically conflicting, 
i.e. inconsistent. Indeed a standard-logic artificial (or human) 
reasoning agent would be entitled to draw any conclusion and 
its contrary from an inconsistent set of information. The 
handling of inconsistent premisses is a multi-facets domain of 
research in its own right [9], and much focus about the fusion 
of several information components has concentrated on the 
situation where these components are mutually logically 
conflicting, also in the legal domain [10]. 
On the contrary, less work has been devoted to situations 
where all the components are both individually and mutually 
consistent. In this case, it is most often assumed that unioning 
the components is what is needed [9], when no specific 
preference schema must prevail. On the contrary, we show that 
the mere union of consistent knowledge components can lead 
to unexpected conclusions: specific care must be provided to 
solve that.  
In this context, two specific problems are identified and 
addressed in the paper: the subsumption issue and the need to 
fuse rules themselves.  
As a case study, we consider real-life examples based on 
the confrontation of the Belgian and the French national legal 
systems about their own bilateral agreement (and its addenda) 
preventing any double taxation from occurring [11]. In the 
following, we express conditions for a resident in Belgium to 
be taxable or free from taxation in Belgium, according to the 
(sometimes) diverging French and Belgian points of view. 
Assume thus that we need to fuse two separate knowledge 
components. Both come from one of the involved legal 
systems, namely the Belgian one. In the first one, it is asserted 
that a Belgian resident pays taxes in Belgium whereas the 
second one merely asserts the same rule with a proviso that the 
individual must not be a French civil servant. Namely, 
Resident ⇒ Taxable 
Resident and not French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Taxable 
Both rules do not contradict one another from a logical 
point of view. According to the standard artificial intelligence 
approaches to belief fusion [13], the fused set of information 
should include both rules. However, the second rule is more 
informative than the first one, as it is intended to preclude the 
first rule from applying to French civil servants. If both rules 
are kept in the fused knowledge then nothing will prevent the 
first rule from applying, even for French civil servants. Clearly, 
this is not what is expected from the fusion process: the second 
rule is expected to prevail over the first one, as it is more 
informative. From a logical point of view, the second rule is a 
mere deductive consequence of the first one: i.e., it is logically 
subsumed by it. A smart fusion engine should detect such 
situations and propose the user to override the subsuming rules 
by the subsumed one. Unfortunately, subsumption does not 
necessarily appear in such an explicit and clear manner. 
Actually, in the worst case, subsumption links can only be 
discovered by considering all the possible logical interactions 
between all pieces of knowledge. This issue is one of the 
problems that are addressed in the paper. 
A second problem is linked to the following phenomenon. 
Actually, the two separate knowledge components also 
respectively contain: 
Resident and not French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Taxable 
Resident and not Work_in_France ⇒ Taxable 
 
Clearly, none of these two rules subsumes the other one. 
Each of them belongs to a separate subpart of the legislation 
and is intended to encode an exception to the law that requires 
residents to pay taxes in Belgium.  
Now, if we have to merge the two knowledge components, 
there is a clash of possible intuitions about the fusion process 
that should handle these two rules. 
On the one hand, when the two rules express some 
sufficient conditions for a resident to be taxable, we must 
include both rules in the fused knowledge. In this way, 
nothing would prevent e.g. the first rule from concluding that 
a resident who is not a French civil servant but works in 
France to be taxable. However, this interpretation can be 
objected. 
Indeed, it might be claimed that either being a French civil 
servant or working in France should be enough for blocking 
the law requiring a resident to pay taxes in Belgium. Under 
this interpretation, the two rules should be fused together and 
replaced by a unique rule: Resident and not Work_in_France 
and not French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Taxable. Indeed, this new 
rule would correctly encode that that either working in France 
or being a French civil servant is a sufficient condition for 
preventing the system to conclude that this resident is taxable 
in Belgium.  
In the paper, we suggest a writing policy for rules that 
avoids this clash of intuitions, as much as possible. When and 
how rules should be fused together in this context is thus 
another concern of the paper. 
II. LOGIC-BASED FRAMEWORK 
To concentrate on the aforementioned conceptual 
problems, we consider the very simple framework of standard 
Boolean logic. Let L be a language of formulas over a finite 
alphabet P of Boolean variables, also called atoms. Atoms are 
noted a, b, c,… The ∧, ∨, ¬ and ⇒ symbols represent the 
standard conjunctive, disjunctive, negation and material 
implication connectives, respectively. A literal is an atom or a 
negated atom. Formulas are built in the usual way from atoms, 
connectives and parentheses; they are noted (resp. f, g, h,…). 
From a syntactical point of view, a knowledge component KC 
will be a set of formulas of L. A formula is in conjunctive 
normal form (CNF) when expressed as a conjunction of 
clauses, where a clause is a disjunction of literals. Let a multi-
set {KC1,…,KCn} of n > 1 knowledge components to be fused. 
The semantical concepts needed in the paper are as follows. 
Let Ω denote the set of all interpretations of L, which are 
functions assigning either true or false to every atom. A model 
ω of KC is an interpretation of Ω that satisfies every formula 
of KC. KC is consistent when its set of models is not empty.  
KC   f expresses that the formula f can be deduced from KC, 
i.e. that it is true in all models of KC. We opt for a semantical 
(vs. a purely syntactical) regard of KC. Under this point of 
view, KC is identified with the set of all its deductive 
consequences. 
Two central concepts in this paper are the strict implicant 
and the subsumption ones, defined as follows. Let f and g be 
two formulas.  f is a strict implicant of g iff  f   g but g    f. 
KC subsumes g iff KC   f  for some strict implicant f of g 
A word of caution might also be needed for readers 
familiar with rule-based systems but not with logic. We 
exploit the full (sound and complete) inferential capability of 
Boolean logic, i.e. we do not only simply allow for mere 
forward and backward chaining on ⇒ as in traditional rule-
based systems. For example, from the rule f ⇒ g and ¬g, we 
infer ¬f using contraposition. Also, the reader not familiar 
with logic should always keep in mind that a rule of the form f 
∧ g ∧¬h ⇒ i ∨ ¬j is logically equivalent to ¬f ∨ ¬g ∨ h ∨ i ∨ 
¬j, and will be treated as such. 
III. POLICY FOR WRITING RULES IN A FUSION PERSPECTIVE   
In the following, we resort to McCarthy’s Abnormality 
notation [14] to emphasize and encode possible exceptions to 
rules (without switching here to a non-monotonic logic). Let 
Ab be a subset of P. Its elements are noted Ab1,…,Abm and 
called abnormality variables. They are intended to represent 
exceptions. For example, the rule “A resident who is not a 
French civil servant pays taxes” can be represented by the 
formulas: 
Resident  ∧ ¬Ab1 ⇒ Taxable 
French_Civil_Servant  ⇒ Ab1 
In the representation of legal knowledge, abnormality 
variables will appear in many rules to allow the representation 
of exceptions to the rules. We require that each KCi uses a 
different subset of Ab, and that these subsets share an empty 
intersection.  
Actually, we expect the lawyer to encode rules with 
exceptions using this mechanism. As we have seen in the 
introduction, some circumstances will require the fusion of   
rules. In the next Sections, we will justify the fact that, in the 
general case, we only fuse formulas whose CNF version, on 
the one hand, contains only positive abnormality literals and, 
on the other hand, share identical subsets of other literals. 
Examples are Resident ∧ ¬Ab1 ⇒ Taxable and Resident ∧ 
¬Ab2  ⇒ Taxable, which should fuse into Resident  ∧ ¬Ab1∧ 
¬Ab2   ⇒ Taxable.  
In this respect, two questions arise. First, what if the 
lawyer wants to encode the above two rules in KC as separate 
items? In the example, how could he (she) translate his (her) 
opinion that ¬Ab1 and ¬Ab2 are two sufficient conditions for a 
Resident to be taxable? Second, how could he (she) encode a 
rule like Resident ∧ ¬Ab ⇒ Taxable inside a KC and prevent 
this rule from being fused with a similar one in another KC?  
Concerning the first question: a solution is simply to allow 
such rules to coexist in a same KC. If the lawyer has not opted 
for their fused form in KC, then this would be interpreted as  
he (she) has decided that the abnormality variables translate 
various sufficient conditions. Several techniques can be 
suggested to solve the second question. The simplest one 
would consist in introducing an additional (negative) ¬Abi 
literal in the clausal form of the rule. In this way, according to 
our limited fusion-of-rules policy, which concerns clauses 
without negative ¬Abi  literals, these rules will never be fused 
together with other rules coming from other KCs. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE SUBSUMPTION ISSUE 
Actually, making sure that a more informative formula is 
not subsumed and thus “hidden” by other ones is a problem 
that must be handled both at the time of creating a knowledge 
component and when fusing several of them. Thus, we 
recommend applying the following technique at both steps. 
Also, keep in mind that formulas need not be explicitly present 
in KC, but can be mere logical consequences from it. 
In order for a formula not to be subsumed in KC or in the 
fused KCs, all strict implicants f of a g must be dropped from 
these sets of formulas. If such an implicant is only a mere 
implicit consequence of KC, then all ways to conclude it 
should deleted. Interestingly, when the clausal form of the KCs 
is considered, it is enough to consider the longest (in terms of 
the number of involved literals) strict implicants of g. For 
example, assume KC contains the formula 
Resident ∧ ¬Ab1 ∧ ¬Ab2 ∧ ¬Ab3 ⇒ Taxable 
The CNF version of the formula is the clause ¬Resident ∨ 
Ab1 ∨ Ab2 ∨ Ab3 ∨ Taxable. Ensuring KC   ¬Resident ∨ Ab1 ∨ 
Ab2 ∨ Ab3 ensures e.g. that KC   ¬Resident ∨ Ab1 (otherwise, 
it would follow from KC  ¬Resident ∨ Ab1 that KC 
 ¬Resident ∨ Ab1 ∨ Ab2 and KC  ¬Resident ∨ Ab1 ∨ Ab2 ∨ 
Ab3).  Thus, if we need to make sure that a formula made of n 
literals is not subsumed, we only need to make sure that none 
of its n longest sub-formulas holds. At this point, two natural 
questions arise. How can we make sure that a strict implicant is 
not entailed? Which formulas should be checked to know 
whether they are subsumed or not? 
In order to check whether a clause is subsumed or not, a 
first straightforward preprocessing step could check whether 
any of its n strict longest sub-clauses is actually present in the 
components. This can be performed efficiently in O(n,m), 
where m is the total number of clauses in the components. 
Obviously enough, this would not allow the detection of more 
complex subsumption links. From a computational point of 
view, checking whether a formula subsumes another one is co-
NP-complete, and thus intractable in the worst case. However, 
recent dramatic progress in Boolean and search makes it often 
possible to get answers within seconds, especially thanks to 
powerful SAT solvers [16], which check whether a set of 
clauses is consistent or not. In [15], some of us have 
experimented a method that proves powerful to address the 
subsumption issue. The goal is not only to answer whether the 
formula is subsumed or not, but also to deliver clauses that can 
be required to be dropped in order to delete the subsumption 
links.  The technique is based on the SAT-solvers technology 
and on methods [17] for delivering so-called MUSEs (Minimal 
Unsatisfiable Subsets). Assume we need to check whether KC 
(that contains g) subsumes g through a strict implicant f of g. In 
the positive case, the set KC ∪ {¬f} is inconsistent. Then, the 
solver looks for the MUSes of this set, namely the (cardinality-
)minimal subsets of clauses, that are inconsistent. Making sure 
that at least one clause in each of the MUSes is dropped 
ensures that the subsumption link is blocked. Dropping such 
clauses can be automatic, or the lawyer can be asked whether 
he (she) really wants to drop them, or even be given the choice 
of selecting the clauses to be dropped in the MUSes. When he 
(she) prefers keeping these MUSes intact, he (she) is then 
conducted to revise his (her) former requirement about the 
subsumption-freeness status of g. This solver provides efficient 
results even for huge KCs, provided that the number of MUSes 
remains small [15].  
Now, it should be clear that such a process remains 
nevertheless computationally heavy. Accordingly, we should 
restrict its use for checking the subsumed status of a limited 
number of clauses. In this respect, we would suggest the lawyer 
to restrict the application of this process to formulas that, at the 
same time, are explicitly present in the components and that 
contain Abi variables, translating explicit rules with possible 
exceptions. Furthermore, only rules where he (she) would not 
accept less Abi to be included in the rules should be checked 
about their subsumption status.  
Finally, a word of caution, the search for subsuming 
formulas of a clause g should consider all the information in 
the components without the facts that correspond to literals 
mentioned in g, since those facts naturally subsume g. Indeed, 
assume ¬resident is established in the components. This fact 
should not be dropped because it subsumes a rule of the form 
resident ∧ …  ∧ … ⇒ …  
V. FUSING RULES THEMSELEVES 
In the general case, a rule of the form a ∧¬Ab ⇒ b needs not 
be explicitly present in a knowledge component KC: it might 
be an implicit logical consequence of KC. Moreover, as soon 
as e.g. ¬a is true, e.g. a ∧¬Ab ⇒ b, a ⇒ b and a ⇒ ¬b can 
also be deduced from KC. Accordingly, for each possible rule, 
checking whether it should be fused or not, is an intractable 
task. 
We thus check rules that are explicitly present in the 
components, only. Our very limited target concerns the rules 
that only differ through their negative literals ¬Abi (positive 
Abi in the clausal form of the rule) and, at the same time, 
belong to different knowledge components.  For example a ∧ 
¬Ab1 ⇒ b and a ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ b are candidates to form a ∧ ¬Ab1 
∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ b. Having identified such rules, we either ask the 
lawyer if he (she) accepts such a fusion of the rules to occur, 
or more bluntly, if the lawyer agrees so we might adopt a 
policy requiring them to be fused automatically. 
For example, assume:  
    KC1:   Work_in_France ∧ ¬Ab1 ⇒ ¬Taxable 
Frontier_Status ⇒ Ab1 
    KC2:  Work_in_France ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ ¬Taxable 
Belgian ∧ French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Ab2 1 
                                                           
1  This is the French version of the agreement (French Conseil d’État 
9/11/1987 N°51075). The Belgians opposed this interpretation for a while: 
according to the Belgians, Belgians who are both French Civil Servants and 
Belgian residents should not pay taxes in Belgium. 
Fusing the first two rules yields  
KCFused: Work_in_France ∧ ¬Ab1 ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ ¬Taxable 
             Frontier_Status ⇒ Ab1 
            Belgian ∧ French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Ab2 
Not fusing them would allow us to conclude e.g. that a 
resident in Belgium who is French, works in France and has 
the special frontier worker status is free from taxation in 
Belgium, which would be a wrong interpretation according to 
both countries. 
Now, it might happen that both formulas a ∧ ¬Ab1 ⇒ b 
and a ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ b do coexist in a same KCi. In this specific 
case, we assume that the lawyer has thus expressed two 
different sufficient conditions for b to be derived from a.  
Accordingly, we do not merge them.  If his (her) goal was to 
express that these two conditions must be met at the same 
time, he (she) would have had to express a ∧ ¬Ab1 ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ 
b directly. 
It is straightforward to program a preprocessor that checks 
for these kinds of rules to be fused and that are coming from 
several components, since it resorts to a mere syntactical 
search among formulas. Obviously, replacing formulas by 
fused ones can be done in constant time. For example, when 
formulas are in CNF, constructing a fused component from 
several ones can be done in O(n log n), where n is the total 
number of clauses in the components. When the clauses are 
sorted according to a lexicographic order, this complexity 
even deflates to O(n).  
Due to the specific role for Abi variables, we shall not 
recommend to fuse other types of formulas in the general case.  
Let us illustrate this through the main other possible forms of 
interactions between formulas involving Abi. 
First, in the general case, it is not acceptable to fuse 
together formulas whose antecedents differ on other literals 
than abnormality ones. We will thus not fuse together a ∧ 
¬Ab1 ⇒ b and a ∧ c ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ b. To illustrate this, assume 
that the first formula asserts that a resident pays taxes and that 
the second one asserts that a resident who has a special 
frontier-worker status pays taxes. Then, merging both 
formulas into a ∧ c ∧ ¬Ab1 ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ b would only allow us 
to infer that a resident pays taxes when he is a frontier-worker; 
residents who are not working in France would thus be free 
from taxation in Belgium: this would clearly be a wrong 
conclusion. 
Also, we will not fuse together formulas that are identical 
except w.r.t. their positive Abi literals: in the general case, we 
should not fuse a ∧ Ab1 ⇒ b and  a ∧ Ab2 ⇒ b into a ∧ Ab1 ∧ 
Ab2 ⇒ b. Indeed, as Abi represent exceptions, this would 
require the simultaneous occurrence of the exceptions encoded 
by Ab1 and Ab2, in order to infer b from a.  Clearly, this would 
be an unacceptable weakening of the information described in 
the initial formulas. For example, according to the French 
point of view, we could have: 
KC1: Work_in_France ∧ Ab1 ⇒ Taxable  
Frontier_Status ⇒ Ab1 
KC2: Work_in_France ∧ Ab2 ⇒ Taxable 
Belgian ∧ French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Ab2 
Fusing the first rules of the KCs would lead to 
KCFused: Work_in_France ∧ Ab1 ∧ Ab2 ⇒ Taxable 
    Frontier_Status ⇒ Ab1 
    Belgian ∧ French_Civil_Servant ⇒ Ab2 
This would require the two sufficient conditions for a 
person working in France to be taxable to be satisfied at the 
same time in order for being taxable in Belgium (namely 
having the frontier worker status and being both a Belgian and 
a French civil servant should be satisfied), which was clearly 
not the intended meaning of the expressed knowledge. A same 
analysis can be held w.r.t. pairs of formulas of the form (Ab1 
⇒ b, Ab2 ⇒ b ). 
In the general case, it does neither seem acceptable to fuse 
two formulas that are identical except that the first one refers 
to e.g. Ab1 and the other one to ¬Ab2, without knowing the 
actual priority or specificity relation linking Ab1 and Ab2. For 
the sake of the generality, we will neither merge them. For 
example, according to the French point of view, we could 
write 
     KC1: French_Civil_Servant  ∧ Ab1 ⇒  ¬Taxable 
French  ⇒ Ab1 
     KC2: French_Civil_Servant ∧ ¬Ab2 ⇒ ¬Taxable 
Belgian ⇒  Ab2 
Merging the first two rules would lead to   
KCFused: French_Civil_Servant∧Ab1∧¬Ab2 ⇒  ¬Taxable 
French  ⇒ Ab1 
Belgian ⇒  Ab2 
and would not allow us to infer anymore that e.g. a French 
civil servant who is Dutch should be free from taxes in 
Belgium. In this specific case, not being Belgian is more 
important than being French in order for being free from taxes 
in Belgium according to the French point of view. However, it 
is easy to find situations where not condition1 should be given 
a lower priority than condition2. Accordingly, for the sake of 
generality, we shall not merge such kinds of rules. 
Since it has been assumed that each KCi uses its own 
subset of Abi propositions and that these subsets share an 
empty intersection, pairs of formulas of (a ⇒ Ab1, b ⇒ Ab1) 
and (a ⇒ ¬Ab1, b ⇒ ¬Ab1) can only occur in a same KCi.  
The first pair of formulas generally expresses sufficient 
conditions for an exception to occur.  In the general case, we 
will not fuse them so that the exceptions should occur 
simultaneously in order for the inference to be permitted. For 
example, we could have, according to the French point of 
view:  
KC1: Work_in_France ∧ ¬Ab1 ⇒  ¬Taxable 
    Frontier_Status ⇒ Ab1 
    Belgian ∧ French_Civil_Servant ⇒  Ab1 
Fusing the last two rules to yield  
KCFused:  Work_in_France∧¬Ab1⇒ ¬Taxable 
         Frontier_Status∧Belgian∧French_Civil_Servant ⇒  Ab1 
would allow us to infer that a French having the special 
frontier worker status working in France is free from taxation, 
which is a wrong conclusion.  
Formulas of the type a ⇒ ¬Ab1 describe conditions for not 
having an exception. Since in the general case, we cannot list 
such conditions exhaustively and since we assume that they 
occur in a same KCi to be fused, we however assume that the 
lawyer has decided to give them a status of sufficient 
condition (otherwise, he (she) would have had to merge them 
into (a ∧ b) ⇒ ¬Ab1).  Finally, we will neither fuse together 
pairs of formulas taken from different categories discussed in 
this Section. 
VI. PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSONS 
Although this research has taken the legal domain as a case 
study, its findings and results can be applied to many other 
domains. Especially, they might be of interest to various areas 
traditionally covered by the information fusion research 
community, including control, supervision and decision 
systems in the defense domains.  
Let us give some examples in that respect. First, consider 
the subsumption issue. Assume that we need to fuse two 
different knowledge systems. The first-one includes the rule 
“It the target is located within the security zone then open 
fire”. The second one is more precise and recommends the 
same decision, except when the target is friendly. A sound and 
complete standard logic-based decision system that would 
include both rules would recommend, based on the first rule, 
to open fire on the target, even when it is a friendly one.  
Clearly, the second rule is a logical consequence of the first 
one. However, we do not want it to be preempted by the first, 
less precise, one. It is important to note that both rules should 
not necessarily be explicit: they might be mere deductive 
conclusions that can be derived from  some other information. 
Also, the subsumption issue and the way we solve it do not 
rely on the syntactical form of the involved formulas. Let us 
illustrate that this also occurs for e.g. disjunctive formulas. 
Assume that a recognition system concludes enemy-tank or 
enemy-SUV. Assume that a second system concludes enemy-
tank or enemy-SUV or friendly-truck. The second sentence is a 
logical consequence of the first one (indeed, whenever the first 
formula is true, the second one is also true). If we want the 
second disjunction to prevail over the first one, then we need 
to retract any ability to infer the first one. 
Examples requiring fusing rules also abound in the defense 
domain. Assume that we have two rules: If the switch is on 
and the switch is not broken then the light is on and If the 
switch is on and the lamp-bulb is not broken then the light is 
on. Clearly, we need to fuse both rules to yield If the switch is 
on and the lamp-bulb is not broken and the switch is not 
broken then the light is on. If we do not fuse the rules then we 
would be able to derive that the light is on when the switch in 
on, even when the lamp-bulb is broken. A similar problem 
occurs, as when additional conditions like lamp-bulb is not 
broken are actually assumptions by default.  All the techniques 
proposed in this paper thus apply here.  
The present work might need some technical extensions to 
better cope with these other domains. First of all, quantitative 
measures of uncertainty could be grafted to rules and taken 
into account in our fusion calculus, which was not necessary 
in the legal domain. Also, the expressivity of the logic could 
be extended in several directions. First, all the results in this 
paper are directly extendable to finite versions of first-order 
logic. Second, the inference mechanism could be extended to a 
non-monotonic one in order e.g. to represent exceptions by 
default. In this respect, [18] provides a first promising study in 
that direction. Note that the Abnormality apparatus is very 
suitable for a natural augmentation of the reasoning paradigms 
of logic with a reasoning-by-default one. Finally, it might also 
be of interest to graft this study to other expressively powerful 
representation mechanisms, such as description logic. We 
intend to pursue these promising lines of research in the 
future. 
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